Irreducible subjectivity and interactionism: a critique.
The authors offer a critique of the privileging of subjectivity in psychoanalysis characteristic of what Hanly has called interactionism, with specific reference to the work of Renik. First, Renik's argument for the irreducible subjectivity of the analyst is explored and critiqued from a philosophical perspective. The need for and plausibility of a subtler notion of objectivity that takes into account the limitations of human subjectivity and that analysts can meaningfully pursue is defended. Second, Renik's 're-visioning' of psychoanalysis, which follows from his notion of irreducible subjectivity, is explored and critiqued. Renik's view of enactments is contrasted with a 'totalistic' perspective of countertransference that allows for important, finer conceptual distinctions. Renik's conceptualisation of countertransference enactments is characterised as a 'special case' of countertransference as a vice. Next, Renik's view of transference is critiqued for privileging the adaptive dimensions of transference, and for potentially sidelining archaic dimensions. Finally, Renik's conclusions and 're-visioning' of psychoanalysis are shown to follow from his modifying or jettisoning certain features of the analytic situation and process. These features and their implications are elaborated on. The conclusion outlines the extent to which the arguments presented can be extended to other advocates of interactionism.